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AN OPEN INFINITE FUTURE IS IMPOSSIBLE
Alexander R. Pruss

According to the Open Futurist there are no true undetermined contingent
propositions about the future. I shall argue on probabilistic grounds that
there are some statements about infinite futures that Open Futurism cannot
handle. The Open Futurist’s best bet is to reject an infinite future, but a Christian philosopher cannot take that bet, and hence should reject Open Futurism.

1. Probability and an Open Future
According to the Open Futurist, there are no true future contingent propositions of the form: “It will be the case that p,” where its being the case
that p is not logically determined by the present state of the world. Either
all such statements are false or they all lack truth value. I shall argue on
the grounds of probability theory that there are certain statements about
infinite futures that Open Futurism cannot handle. The Open Futurist’s
best bet would be to reject the possibility of an infinite future, but I argue
that the Christian Open Futurist cannot take that bet, as humanity’s hope
lies in an everlasting heavenly joy. Thus the Christian philosopher should
reject Open Futurism.
Before considering the main argument, let’s think about a simpler probabilistic argument against Open Futurism. Suppose that I am determined
by the present conditions and laws of nature to flip an indeterministic fair
coin in exactly five minutes. According to Open Future views, it is neither
true that the coin will land heads nor that it will fail to land heads (either
both statements are false or neither statement has a truth value). Yet by
definition of fairness, the probability that the coin will land heads is 1/2.
So the Open Futurist has to believe both that it is not true that the coin will
land heads and that the probability that it will land heads is 1/2. Yet surely
if one believes that it is not true that the coin will land heads, one assigns
a probability less than 1/2 to the proposition. We can make the problem
sharper by supposing the coin to be unfair and to have a probability 9/10 of
landing heads. Then the Open Futurist has to believe both that it is not true
that the coin will land heads and that it has a probability 9/10 of doing so.1
These claims are uncomfortable, but perhaps an Open Futurist can live
with them. The Open Futurist can, for instance, say that there is a tenseless
This is a variant on the argument of Pruss, “Probability and the Open Future View.”
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proposition, u, that the coin lands heads at t5, where t5 is five minutes from
now. The sentence “The coin will land heads in five minutes” can be said
to have u as its “tenseless content” (no claim is made that the tenseless
content exhausts the meaning of the sentence). Then the probability that
the coin will land heads in five minutes is r because u has a chance of
degree r to become true.2 In other words, claims about the probabilities of
future contingents are claims about the chances-to-become-true of tenseless propositions that are at present neither true nor false.3
2. Probability and an Infinite Open Future
But there is a more serious problem for the Open Futurist. Imagine a
possible world with a finite past and an infinite future where the laws
of nature and initial conditions determine that (a) the past is finite, (b)
the future is infinite and (c) every day an indeterministic and fair coin is
tossed. Let q be the proposition that the coin lands heads infinitely many
times. The Law of Large Numbers4 implies that with probability 1, the
limiting frequency of heads in the coin’s tosses is 1/2. Since there will be
infinitely many tosses, if the limiting frequency of heads is 1/2, there must
be infinitely many heads. Hence, the probability of q is one.
Now, some may cavil that the probability of q is 1 minus an infinitesimal
rather than 1, since there is an infinitesimal chance that the coin will, say,
always land tails.5 Either way, it is clear that the probability of q is nearly 1,
a term I will stipulatively use to mean either 1 or 1 minus an infinitesimal.
But the Open Futurist has a problem here. Her theory commits her not
only to the claim that q isn’t true, but also to the claim that q never becomes
true. For there is always a causal possibility that there will be only finitely
many heads. And yet q has a probability of nearly 1. How can one believe
that a proposition with probability nearly 1 is neither true nor becomes
true?
We can make the problem sharper. Let q* be the proposition that an
indeterministic and fair coin is tossed on every day of a time sequence that
goes on forever and lands heads on infinitely many of these days. Given as
background information that some coin is determined to be thus tossed,
the probability of q* will be nearly 1. But on an Open Future view, it is
impossible that the proposition q* ever be true. For, necessarily, on every
day of every time sequence, q* is not true, since if q* were true, there would
Cf. Rhoda, “Probability, Truth, and The Openness of the Future.”
And one really does need to work with tenseless propositions here. For what truth value
the tensed proposition that the coin will land heads in five minutes will have is irrelevant to
us. The truth value that this tensed proposition will have, for instance, in five minutes has
to do with a potential toss in ten minutes, rather than the toss we care about, the one in five
minutes. I take the use of “subsequently” by Rhoda (“Probability, Truth, and The Openness
of the Future,” 199) to be such a tenseless claim, in light of his claims (“Probability, Truth,
and The Openness of the Future,” 201) that once the events described in it have happened,
it is true.
4
Chung, Course in Probability Theory, §5.4.
5
But see Williamson, “How Probable is an Infinite Sequence of Heads?”
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be a fact about future contingents, namely that the coin will land heads
infinitely often (whether the past tosses were heads or tails is irrelevant, as
there were only finitely many past tosses).
One may worry that the scenario of an infinite number of coin tosses
commits one to an actual infinite, contrary to the arguments of finitists like
Craig.6 Talk of how many times the coin will land heads over an infinite
makes it sound like there actually might be an infinite number of future
heads tosses. However, the scenario can be formulated without any such
worries. The claim that the future is infinite can be put like this: “Time is
not circular, tomorrow there will be a day, and after every day there will
be another day.” And, assuming this claim about an infinite future, the
claim that the coin will land heads infinitely many times can be put like
this: “There will be at least one heads landing, and some time after every
heads landing there will be another heads landing.”
Thus, we have a conflict: the Law of Large Numbers tells us that q* is
nearly certain, while Open Futurism tells us that q* cannot ever be true.
We shouldn’t abandon the Law of Large Numbers. Probably the most
philosophically vulnerable of our assumptions is that the future could be
infinite. After all, there are many paradoxes of infinity.7 So the Open Futurist’s best bet is to reject to the possibility of an infinite future.
But a Christian philosopher’s hope is for an eternal life in union with
God. There are two ways of conceptualizing this eternal life. Either it is
everlasting, in the sense that after every day (or some other unit during
which the kinds of physical movements involved in flipping a coin can be
made) there is another day and time is non-circular, or it is timeless. We
may worry about the coherence of timelessness coming after a life, but,
apart from that, the timeless option is highly implausible in light of the
doctrine, so central to the New Testament and Christian tradition, of the
resurrection of the body.8 Without time there can be no motion or change.
But without motion, manipulative organs like arms and legs are pointless,
and without change there is no exercise of sensory organs aimed at the
reception of temporally sequenced data such as eyes (light is a wave, and
waves are temporally sequenced) and ears.
While according to the Gospel narratives the resurrected Jesus is difficult to recognize as the same individual as prior to the resurrection, and
our resurrected bodies may have many additional capabilities that we
now have no idea of, the New Testament presents the resurrected Jesus as
having a body with the kind of shape (e.g., John 20:27) and at least many of
the same capabilities that we have—he can talk, walk, stand, break bread
and eat fish (e.g., Luke 24:13–43). More generally, it seems there could not
be any timeless functioning of a living body where “body” has the organic
E.g., Craig, Kalam Cosmological Argument.
E.g., Benardete, Infinity.
8
For an excellent discussion of the centrality of the resurrection of the body to Christian
views of the afterlife, see Cullman, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead?
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sense of the Greek word sôma (as opposed to the sense of “body” used in
first-year physics9).
Perhaps a human body could exist in a timeless frozen state, but it
would be a non-functional body, and such a state would not be a state of
full human flourishing, nor would the doctrine that there is a resurrection of the body be of central importance to Christian hope then. But the
resurrection of the body is crucial, so eternal life is everlasting—and hence
infinite—rather than timeless.
So a Christian philosopher should not deny an infinite future. Hence a
Christian philosopher should not believe in an Open Future.10
Baylor University
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Perhaps a “body” in the physics sense could have a function of changelessly pressing
on another body, as in Kant’s famous example of the lead ball changelessly pressing on a
cushion (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A203/B248–249). It is not the fulfillment of human
organic life to have just such functions.
10
I am very grateful to an anonymous reader for a number of helpful criticisms and to the
editor for a number of helpful suggestions.

